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Servicemen in Civilian Courts
An off-duty Army lieutenant, opposed to the war in Vietnam,
marches for peace with a sign demanding "End Johnson's Fascist Ag-
gression." Court-martialed, he is convicted of "using contemptuous
words against the President" and sentenced to confinement and dis-
missal from the service.
But for his military status, the young officer would clearly be pro-
tected by the First Amendment. With his entry into the armed forces,
however, the lieutenant's constitutional rights vanished into limbo.
Neither history nor authoritative judicial statement defines the status
of the serviceman under the Constitution. Arguments can still be
made for blanket exclusion from the Bill of Rights or for virtually
complete protection. Symptomatically, the district courts for Utah and
Kansas reached opposite conclusions recently concerning the service-
man's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.'
Civilian courts cannot agree even on their jurisdiction to determine
whether servicemen have constitutional rights. Because federal courts
have never had appellate jurisdiction over military tribunals,2 the
serviceman can present constitutional claims to Article III courts3 only
in collateral attacks.4 And there is no agreement on the scope of col-
1. Compare Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316, 320 (D. Utah 1965) "IThe
Sixth Amendment ... applies to ... the military service, as far as concerns the right to
the assistance of counsel") with LeBallister v. Warden, 247 F. Supp. 349, 352 (D. Kan.
1965) ("An accused before a military court is not entitled as a matter of right tinder
the Sixth Amendment to representation by legally trained counsel.").
2. In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126 (1900); Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243
(1864); Shaw v. United States, 209 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
3. Military courts are legislative courts created by Congress under U.S. CoNsr. art. I,
§ 8; their jurisdiction is independent of article III judicial power. In re Vidal, 179 U.S.
126, 127 (1900); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857).
4. The most common form of collateral attack on court-martial convictions is by
petition for habeas corpus, but other modes of attack are possible. Actions against court-
martial members or those carrying out its orders for damages caused by illegal proceed-
ings were once popular, but have fallen from use. See, e.g., Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S.
(20 How.) 65 (1857); Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 330 (1806). Suits for back pay
are today the usual remedy when the serviceman is not presently confined and habeas
corpus is hence unavailable. See, e.g., Shaw v. United States, 357 F.2d 949 (Ct. CI. 1966).
When habeas corpus is unavailable the serviceman or former serviceman may also bring
an action of mandamus to compel the proper administrative authorities to make ap.




lateral review. The district courts for Utah and Kansas, for example,
were fully as out of phase in defining the scope of review as in con-
struing the Sixth Amendment. The Utah court thought it had juris-
diction to "vindicat[e] constitutional rights."" The Kansas court held
that court-martial convictions "may be reviewed only when void be-
cause of absolute want of power, and are not merely voidable because
of the defective exercise of power possessed."0
Preoccupied with jurisdictional qualms, the federal courts cannot
but fail to resolve the underlying constitutional issues. This note will
attempt to prune the procedural thicket in order to place the substan-
tive problems of constitutional rights in perspective. The effort must
begin with an examination of the historical relationship between
courts-martial and the Constitution.
The sole reference to the military in the Bill of Rights is found in
the Fifth Amendment, where cases arising in the land or naval forces
are excepted from the requirement of indictment by grand jury.7 The
legislative history of the first ten amendments suggests a similar exclu-
sion of the military from the petit jury guarantee of the Sixth Amend-
ment but can otherwise be interpreted to extend to servicemen the
protection of the Bill of Rights. Scant attention was paid to the mili-
tary in the framing of the first ten amendments," however, and the
traditional isolation of the military law from civilian standards in the
5. Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316, 320 (D. Utah 1965).
6. LeBallister v. Warden, 247 F. Supp. 349, 352 (D. Kan. 1965). The court quotes
from Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 401 (1902).
7. The Fifth Amendment reads, in relevant part,
No person shall be held to answyer for a capital, or othenise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war
or public danger ....
8. Briefly, the argument proceeds from the fact that the grand and petit jury re-
quirements were initially paired in a separate amendment in which the clause excluding
the land or naval forces could be read to apply to both. Because of changes made in the
Senate, the guarantees were eventually placed separately in the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments, with the land-and-naval-forces clause accompanying only the grand jury pro-
vision, for no discernible reason. It can therefore be argued that the military were in-
cluded in the remaining provisions of the Bill of Rights, since they were not specifically
excluded as they initially were in the grand and petit jury requirements. See Henderson,
Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HAR. L. REv.
293, 303-16 (1957).
9. Henderson's argument rests essentially on the fact that the Framers never dealt
with the military in composing the non-jury provisions of the Bill of Rights, which
leads to a possible interpretation rather than a positive argument that the military were
included. The problem of determining the intent of the Framers is understated when
Henderson observes, "Mhose who framed and ratified the Constitution and its first ten
amendments did not leave as much evidence of their thoughts concerning military justice
as we might wish .... " Henderson, supra note 8, at 297. The soundest conduslon to
be drawn from such ringing silence is simply that the Framers had weightier problems
to consider in drafting the Bill of Rights than the protection of the handful of men
(see note 72 infra) who then constitutd the "land and naval forces."
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eighteenth century0 undercuts the conclusion that the authors of the
Bill of Rights expected to effect any change whatever in court-martial
practice.
Whatever the intention of the Framers, if any," the evolution of
the military law in the nineteenth century was unaffected by the Bill
of Rights. Constitutional issues were rarely advanced in military trials,
and when raised were rudely squelched. 12 Nor did civilian courts
apply constitutional standards to courts-martial. The Supreme Court
refused to pass upon claims of the grossest injustices when military
convictions were collaterally attacked,'13 and in doing so occasionally
stated or suggested that courts-martial were outside some or all of the
Bill of Rights. 14
The Court's dicta, however, must be understood in light of the
narrow nineteenth century scope of collateral review. In both civilian
and military cases' 5 review was limited to the jurisdictional issues of
whether the sentencing court was properly constituted,16 had juris-
10. Although treatises of the period sometimes referred to the civilian law as a source
for rules to be followed when the military code was silent, see, e.g., STEPUEN Avyr, A
TREATIS ON CouRTs MARTIAL 66 (3d ed. 1785), the military law was characteristically
treated as a distinct field of jurisprudence. See generally ADYE, supra; 2 McARTZUR,
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE oF NAVAL AND MILITARY COURTS MARTIAL (4th ed. 1813); TYTLEsI,
AN E SAY ON MILITARY LAW (1800).
11. See note 9 supra.
12. *See generally Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practica
(pts. 1, 2), 72 HARv. L. R1v. 1, 266 (1958). Colonel Wiener sets out to refute the Henderson
thesis, see notes 8-9 supra, by showing that court-martial practice was not controlled by
the Bill of Rights in the nineteenth century. He succeeds, with massive documentation.
13. See, e.g., Keyes v. United States, 109 U.S. 336 (1883). The commander of Lieutenant
Keyes' regiment had functioned as "prosecutor, witness and judge" at his court-martial,
Justice Blatchford, for a unanimous Court, concluded in a two-page opinion that since
the court-martial had had jurisdiction of the case, the conviction could not be upset
"whatever irregularities or errors .. .occurred." Id. at 340.
14. The strongest dictum appeared in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 138
(1866) (concurring opinion of Chase, C.J.): "iMhe power of Congress, in the government
of the land and naval forces .... is not at all affected by the fifth or any other amend-
ment." The case involved a conviction by military commission rather than by a court-
martial; for the distinction, see 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTicE 1 0.5[l ] (2d ed. 1964). In
Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696, 700 (1882), the Court stated, " 'Cases ansing in the land
or naval forces' are expressly excepted from the operation of the Fifth Amendment . .. ."
See also Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897) (Sixth Amendment not considered
in rejecting double jeopardy claim); Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 390 (1902)
(accused's "status as an officer of the Army, must be borne in mind in deciding whether
the [fifth] amendment, if applicable, was or was not violated by this sentence').
15. The Supreme Court usually defined the military scope of review in terms of
civilian doctrine and precedent. See, e.g., Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 388-90,
401 (1902); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 23 (1879). To the extent that a distinction was
drawn between civilian and military cases, military convictions were considered more
vulnerable to collateral attack because there was no presumption of jurisdiction attaching
to the judgments of court-martial, which were (and are) ad hoc tribunals of limitedjurisdiction. See, e.g., McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49, 68-69 (1902); Runkle v. United
States, 122 US. 543, 555-56 (1887); Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 191, 208-09 (1829).
16. E.g., McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49, 69 (1902).
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diction over the accused17 and over the offense,18 and had power to
impose the sentence.' 9 Since attention was riveted on the jurisdiction
of the sentencing court, the Justices never ventured upon a serious
analysis of courts-martial and the Constitution.
By the time of World War II, however, the expansion in the scope
of review in civilian cases20 suggested that military prisoners might at
last press constitutional claims in the federal courts. By 1942 even the
language of the jurisdictional test had been discarded, and the civilian
prisoner could seek habeas corpus relief for a violation of his consti-
tutional rights.2' Military prisoners soon argued that court-martial
convictions could be similarly attacked. Petitions peppered the district
courts and met a warm reception from federal judges incensed by the
alleged injustices of wartime courts-martial.22 Recent civilian prece-
17. E.g., Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 23 (1879).
18. E.g., Dynes v. Hoover, 61 US. (20 How.) 65. 82 (1857).
19. E.g., Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 565, 394 (1902); Ex parte Mason, 105 US.
696, 697 (1881).
20. Commentators have reached widely differing condusions concerning the timing
and extent of the expansion in the scope of collateral review after 1867, when Congress
granted federal courts the jurisdiction to entertain petitions for habeas corpus from
state prisoners, Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (now 28 US.C. q 2241(c)(3)
(1964)). See generally Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed
Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court
Trial, 113 U. PA. L. R.v. 793, 819-25, 882-96 1965); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Hv. L. REV. 441, 465-99 (1963); Hart,
Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HAv.
L. R v. 84, 103-06 (1959); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State
Proceeding, 74 HAnv. L. REv. 1315, 1324-30 (1961). The present Justices of the Supreme
Court have also reached conflicting readings of the development of federal habeas corpus.
Compare the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1953) with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, 372 U.S. at 448.
A balanced reading of the sources indicates that the scope of review may have been
broadened slightly between 1867 and 1915. but that if so the expansion was slight and
not consistently applied. Certainly the language of the jurisdictional test was never
abandoned. The Supreme Court did broaden the scope of review for state prisoners in
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), when it intimated that a hearing would have
been required had the state failed to provide corrective process for the claimed denial
of due process of law. Eight years later a hearing was ordered in Moore v. DempFsy,
261 U.S. 86 (1923), because the state had not provided an adequate remedy for a similar
claim of a trial dominated by mob hysteria. A rationale for the expanded scope of review
was advanced in Johnson v. Zerbst, 804 U.S. 458, 468 (1938), a case involving a federal
prisoner: "A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost 'in the course of
the proceedings' due to failure to complete the court . . . by providing counsel for an
accused who . .. has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty ....
21. See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942):
[Habeas corpus] is not restricted to those cases where the judgment of conviction
is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court to render it. It extends also to those
exceptional cases where the conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional
rights of the accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of prserving
his rights.
The reasoning of Waley, which involved a federal prisoner, was extended to state prisoners
in House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945), and White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
22. For a thorough discussion of the lower court decisions before 1950, see Pasley,
The Federal Courts Look at the Court-Martial, 12 U. Per. L. REv. 7 (1950).
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dents were invoked,23 and military convictions were suddenly vulner-
able if the prisoner could claim a violation of constitutional rights.2 4
But any prospect of wholesale invalidation of military convictions
was scotched in 1950 when the Supreme Court firmly foreclosed exam-
ination of military rights in Hiatt v. Brown.Y The court of appeals
28. Schita v. King, 133 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1943), actually arose from a World War I
conviction. The district court had concluded that even if true the petitioner's omnibus
allegations would not justify collateral attack on his conviction. The court of appeals,
citing a raft of recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with civilian prisoners, held
that "in view of the trend of the modem decisions . . . , we cannot accept that view
as sound" and remanded the case for a new hearing. Id. at 287. In Beets v. Hunter, 75
F. Supp. 825 (D. Kan. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 180 F.2d 101 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
839 U.S. 963 (1950), Judge lurrah had "no difficulty in finding that the court which
tried this man was saturated with tyranny; the compliance with the Articles of War
and with military justice was an empty and farcical compliance only" and ordered the
petitioner discharged. 75 F. Supp. at 826. The "totality of errors" in the pro-trial investi-gation and court-martial of the petitioner in Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 288 (M JD. Pa.
1946), convinced Judge Biggs that the prisoner should be discharged because 'the pro.
cedures of the military law were not applied to Hicks in a fundamentally fair way."
Id. at 250. The district court in Anthony v. Hunter, 71 F. Supp. 823 (D. Kan. 1947),
ordered the prisoner discharged because of inadequacies in the pre-trial investigationof his case. In discussing the scope of review, the court noted, "Later cases seem to haveenlarged the scope of the inqury to be made by a district court in habeas corpus pro,
ceedings, making the remedy available t test the validity of a judgment of a stateor federal court-and, a fortiori, it would seem, of a court-m rtial-attacked on thground that constitutional rights of the prisoner have been violated." Id. at 828. Thebroadened scope of collateral review in civilian cases was also applied to a militaryhabeas corpus petition in United States ex ref. Innes vH Hiatt, 141 F2d 664, 665-66 (ldCir. 1944), although the court concluded that the allegations, if true, amounted only
to procedural error.Not all of the lower courts joined the movement to apply the enlarged civilian scope
of review to military petitions. When the court-martial co-defendant of the successulpetitioner in Anthony v. Hunter, supra, sought habeas corpus relief in the district wherehe was imprisoned, he was rudely rebuffed: The court-martial was properly convened.It had jurisdiction of the offense and of the parties. The sentence was within the law.These facts being irrefutably established, the civil court may not inquire further."
Arnold v. Cozart, 75 F. Supp. 47, 48 (N.D. Tex. 1948). Judge Learned Hand also felt no
impulse to board the bandwagon of broadened review. See Henry v. Hodges, 171 F.2d
401 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 968 (1949), reversing 76 F. Supp. 968 (S.D.N.Y.
1948).
24. Defining the constitutional rights of servicemen was complicated, however, by
the early Supreme Court dicta suggesting that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the
military, see note 14 supra. Unless the Court's words were to be ignored or explained
away, the military seemed beyond the protection of the first ten amendments. But even
if "to those in the military or naval service of the United States the military law Is due
process," Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 804 (1911); accord, United States ex rel.
Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 836, 344 (1922); United States ex rel. French v. Weeks, 259
U.S. 326, 335 (1922), the serviceman might still be considered to have a constitutional
right to that due process promised him by the military law. It was this conception
that "the due process clause guarantees [servicemen) that the military procedure will
be applied to them in a fundamentally fair way," United States ex ref. Innes v, Hiatt,
141 F.2d 664, 666 (3d Cir. 1944), that provided the constitutional foundation for the
expansion in the military scope of review among the lower courts. See also Anthony v.
Hunter, 71 F. Supp. 823, 831 (D. Kan. 1947); Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 238, 249-50
(M.D. Pa. 1946); but see Kuykendall v. Hunter, 187 F.2d 545, 546 (10th Cir. 1951);
Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205, 207-08 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
25. 339 U.S. 103 (1950). The Court avoided the scope of review problem in two earlier
post-war military cases. Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695 (1949); Wade v. Hunter, 886
U.S. 684 (1949). To the extent that the opinions deal at all with the scope of review,
the Court seems to have spoken in words of studied ambiguity.
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had found the record "replete with highly prejudicial errors and irreg-
ularities" which invalidated the conviction.20 The Supreme Court
held the lower court "was in error in extending its review, for the
purpose of determining compliance with the due process clause, to
such matters. . 27 Without even a nod toward the landmark civilian
decisions the Court reached all the way back to 1890 for a military
precedent, In re Grimley,28 and the standard that "The single inquiry,
the test, is jurisdiction."2 9
The Court may have relented slightly from this antediluvian view
later in the term when it suggested that a denial of the opportunity
to tender the issue of insanity might divest a court-martial of juris-
diction.30 If so, the test of jurisdiction stood with its cornice barely
chipped until Burns v. Wilson.31
The petitioners in Burns, two Air Force men convicted of a rape-
murder on Guam, claimed that they had been illegally detained while
confessions were coerced from them, that they were denied the effec-
tive assistance of counsel, that evidence favorable to them had been
suppressed while perjured testimony was procured by the prosecution,
and that they had been tried in an "atmosphere of terror and ven-
geance." 32 The district court had dismissed the petition.1 The court
of appeals, after a full examination of the record, had held that the
allegations were insufficient to require a hearing on the merits.3 4
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, but none of the four
opinions filed attracted a majority of the Justices. Justice Minton alone
was willing to affirm the lower courts along the narrow jurisdictional
lines of In re Grimley and Hiatt v. Brown.35
Chief Justice Vinson voted to affirm in an opinion joined by Justices
Reed, Burton and Clark on the grounds that "when a military decision
has dealt fully and fairly with an allegation raised in that application
[for a writ of habeas corpus], it is not open to a federal civil court
26. Hiatt v. Brown, 175 F.2d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 1949) (alternate grounds), rev'd, 339
U.S. 103 (1950).
27. 339 U.S. at 110.
28. 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
29. 339 US. at 111.
30. Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 US. 122 (1950).
31. 346 U.S. 137, rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 844 (1953).
32. Id. at 138 (opinion of Vinson, C.J.).
33. Burns v. Lovett, 104 F. Supp. 312 (D.D.C.), Dennis v. Lovett, 104 F. Supp. 810
(D.D.C.), aff'd, 202 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1952), ard sub nom. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S.
137 (1953).
34. Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1952), af'd sub nor. Burns v. Wilson,
346 U.S. 137 (1953).
35. 346 U-S. at 146-48. Justice Jackson concurred in the result without opinion.
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to grant the writ simply to reevaluate the evidence."30 Vinson went
on to state, however,
Had the military courts manifestly refused to consider those
claims, the District Court was empowered to review them de novo.
For the constitutional guarantee of due process is meaningful
enough, and sufficiently adaptable, to protect soldiers-as well as
civilians. .... 37
The Chief Justice thereby recognized both that servicemen enjoy
some rights arising under the Constitution and that habeas corpus
was available to vindicate these rights. Unfortunately, instead of ex-
pounding these rights and delineating the broadened scope of review,
the Chief Justice attempted to explain why "military habeas corpus
applications cannot simply be assimilated to the law which governs" 8
civilian petitions:
But in military habeas corpus the inquiry, the scope of matters
open for review, has always been more narrow than in civil cases.
Military law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists
separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judi-
cial establishment. This Court has played no role in its develop-
ment; we have exerted no supervisory power over the courts which
enforce it; the rights of men in the armed forces must be condi-
tioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty,
and the civil courts are not the agencies which must determine the
precise balance to be struck in this adjustment. The Framers ex-
pressly entrusted that task to Congress.39
The two dissenters saw no reason to narrow the scope of review
because of military considerations, whatever effect they might have on
the ultimate decision. Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice
Black, argued that habeas review is proper whenever the military
courts fail to apply the appropriate constitutional standards.40
Justice Frankfurter voted for reargument of Burns;41 when a rehear-
ing was denied later in the term, he protested that "the military authori-
ties, the bar, and the lower courts ... ought not to be left with [an]
inconclusive determination .... ,,42 By the time of this second opinion
36. 346 U.S. at 142.
37. Ibid.
38. Id. at 139-40.
39. Ibid.
40. Id. at 150-55 (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.).
41. Jd. at 148 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
42. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 844 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
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Frankfurter was willing to reject flatly Vinson's statement that the
scope of review in military habeas corpus was historically more nar-
row than in civilian cases. Choosing Johnson v. Zerbst43 as the great
watershed in civilian habeas corpus,44 Frankfurter pointed out that
until 1938 "the scope of habeas corpus in both military and civil cases
was equally narrow; in both classes of cases it was limited solely to
questions going to the 'jurisdiction' of the sentencing court."4 5 In
view of the subsequent expansion in civilian doctrine, he asked for
reargument in order that Johnson v. Zerbst could be "appropriately
applied, as it has been by the lower courts, in the military sphere." 40
The lower courts have, by and large, taken Vinson's opinion as that
of the Court, and have been admittedly and unashamedly confused by
it. The Chief Justice's cursory analysis of the differences between
civilian and military law has convinced most lower courts that mili-
tary habeas corpus cannot be analogized to civilian doctrine. But with
civilian precedents thus excluded and the traditional test of jurisdic-
tion destroyed by Burns, the lower courts have been left to the dubious
guidance of the Vinson opinion itself.4 7
Occasionally courts have perversely clung to the "absolute want of
power" test, apparently unable to extract any replacement from
Burns.48 More often, the courts have tried to glean significance from
the "fully and fairly" evaluated test so hastily sketched by Chief Justice
Vinson. The favorite interpretation49 of the test has been that the
43. 04 U.S. 458 (1938).
44. By his selection of Johnson v. Zerbst Frankfurter seems tacitly to have concluded
that military prisoners should receive the habeas corpus treatment of federal prisoners.
The lower federal courts which had previously suggested an expansion in military
habeas corpus generally cited cases dealing with federal and state prisoners without dis-
tinction. See, e.g., Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 335, 339 nn.10-14 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Anthony
v. Hunter, 71 F. Supp. 823, 828 n.3 (D. Kan. 1947); Schita v. King, 133 F.2d 283, 287
(8th Cir. 1943). Mr. Justice Douglas in his Burns dissent similarly cites cases dealing
with both federal and state prisoners. 346 U.S. at 154 (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.).
While military prisoners are of course prisoners of the federal government, it would
seem that they can be assimilated to state prisoners for habeas corpus purposes to the
extent the military prisoner is not sui generis, since the military courts are, like state
courts, separate and distinct from the federal courts in evolution and operation.
45. 346 U.S. at 846.
46. Id. at 851.
47. The Supreme Court has decided two habeas corpus cases involving servicemen since
1953. However, neither presented any constitutional claims, and in neither did the
Court clarify the broadened scope of review advanced in Burns. Fowler v. Wilkinson,
353 U.S. 583 (1957); Jackson v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 569 (1957).
48. See, e.g., LeBallister v. Warden, 247 F. Supp. 349 (D. Kan. 1965).
49. To speak of a "favorite interpretation," a possibly forced order must be imposed
on a diverse array of cases. The courts have scattered in their attempted interpretations
of Burns; as Professor Bishop has pointed out in discussing the cases before 1960, "Mhe
reported opinions of the lower federal courts . . . . although numerous, do not lend
themselves to facile taxonomy." Bishop, Civilian Judges and Military Justice: Collateral
Review of Court-Martial Convictions, 61 CoLum. L. Rxv. 40, 60 (1961). It is believed a
pattern can be found in the cases, however, if not a pattern unmarred by exceptions.
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habeas court must satisfy itself that the military courts have given
the serviceman's claim complete and impartial consideration but need
not then go on to decide the correctness of the conclusions reached.60
This reading drastically limits the scope of collateral review, since
rarely will the serviceman be able to show that the military courts
have "manifestly refused" to consider his claim.
Moreover, the petitioner's slender hopes for review all but disappear
when the federal habeas corpus court concludes that "obviously, it
cannot be said that [the military courts] have refused to consider claims
not asserted."5 1 If the claim was not presented to the military tribunals,
habeas corpus is barred whenever the issue might have been raised.
If the issue was asserted, it will have been "fully and fairly considered"
unless the military courts blatantly refused to pass upon the merits.
By this double-barreled standard, the military prisoner can hope to
succeed only in those rare instances when he can convince the habeas
court that the issue could not have been raised in the military courts.
Most lower courts have avoided the literal impact of their own inter-
pretations of the "fully and fairly" evaluated test. After paying lip
service to a stem rule, they have edged hesitantly to the merits.02 But
the courts' jurisdictional uncertainties have made them reluctant to
fashion new constitutional doctrine or contradict the military author-
ities.53
50. See, e.g., Palomera v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 937 (1oth Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 946
(1965); Fischer v. Ruffner, 277 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1960); Bennett v. Davis, 267 F.2d 15
(10th Cir. 1959); Thomas v. Davis, 249 F.2d 232 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
927 (1958); Mitchell v. Swope, 224 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1955); Suttles v. Davis, 215 F.2d 760
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 903 (1954); Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483 (1oth Cir.
1953); United States ex rel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 256 F. Supp. 679 (M.D. Pa. 1966),Richards v. Cox, 184 F. Supp. 107 (D. Kan. 1960).
51. Suttles v. Davis, 215 F.2d 760, 763 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 903 (1954),
see also Bennett v. Davis, 267 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1959); Thomas v. Davis, 249 F.2d 232
(10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 927 (1958); but see Rushing v. Wilkinson, 272
F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 914 (1960).
52. On occasion courts have justified going to the merits of claims by noting the
hazy outlines of the scope of review under Burns. See Swisher v. United States, 354 F.2d
472, 475 (8th Cir. 1966); Burns v. Harris, 340 F.2d 383, 385 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 960 (1965). More frequently the lower courts have reached the asserted issues by
ignoring their own statement of the scope of review. See, e.g., Bennett v. Davis, 26
F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1959); Thomas v. Davis, 249 F.2d 232 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 927 (1958); Sutfles v. Davis, 215 F.2d 760 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 903
(1954).
53. For example, in Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1953), the court re-
fused to find that the use of a deposition under Article of War 25, Act of June 4, 1920,
ch. 227, sub ch. II, § 1, 41 Stat. 792, denied the petitioner the right to confrontation
at his court-martial. Seven years later the Court of Military Appeals (see note 63 infra
and accompanying text) reversed a court-martial conviction preceded by the use of
depositions under article 49 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 849
(1964), holding that the Sixth Amendment limited the use of such depositions in military
trials to those taken with the accused and his counsel present. United States v. Jacoby,
11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960). Last summer a district court was unwilling
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This passivity of the lower courts must be placed in the context of
growing concern for the status of the military under the Constitution.
The Supreme Court, if it has yet to apply a specific Bill of Rights
guaranteed to the serviceman, has realized that military rights can no
longer be dismissed by a simple reference to history. The Vinson
opinion in Burns indicated that servicemen are in some sense pro-
tected by the Constitution.5 4 Justices Black and Douglas went con-
siderably farther in their dissent.5 In a 1956 opinion joined by Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Douglas, Justice Black
stated that while "military trial does not give an accused the same pro-
tection which exists in civilian courts . . . , as yet it has not been
dearly settled to what extent the Bill of Rights and other protective
parts of the Constitution apply to military trials."' G Chief Justice War-
ren, speaking outside the Court, has given a wide reading to Burns and
indicated that "our citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic
rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes.'5 T
The Supreme Court's curtailment of the personal jurisdiction of
courts-martial also indicates the Court's concern over the limited con-
stitutional rights accorded the court-martial accused. The Court has
determined to "restrict military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction
deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among troops in
active service."' s The Court ruled in 1955 that discharged servicemen
could not be recalled and tried by court-martial for crimes committed
on active duty. 9 Two years later, it held that civilian dependents
could not be tried by the military during peacetime for capital
crimes. 60 This limitation was extended in 1960 to non-capital peace-
time offenses committed by dependents"' or civilian employees accom-
panying the armed forces overseas. 02
While the Supreme Court has merely shown its concern, the military
courts have judiciously extended broad constitutional rights to service-
to consider on the merits the retroactive application of Jacoby to a 1956 court-martial
conviction. United States ex tel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 256 F. Supp. 679 (M.D. Pa. 196).
54. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953).
55. Id. at 152-53 (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.).
56. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 (1957) (opinion of Black, J.) (dictum).
57. Warren, The Bill of Rights and tze Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 181, 188 (192).
58. United States ex Tel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955).
59. United States ex tel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
60. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
61. Kinsella v. United States ex tel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
62. McElroy v. United States ex tel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v.
Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960). For a thorough discussion of other problems of court-martial
jurisdiction of the person, see Bishop, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over MilitaTy-Civilian
Hybrids: Retired Regulars, Reservists, and Discharged Prisoners, 112 U. PA. L. Ryv.
317 (1964).
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men. A thorough system of appellate review within the military system
was created for the first time in 1950 when Congress recodified the
military law and made it uniform throughout the services.03 Under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice 4 all court-martial proceedings
in which the sentence includes a punitive discharge or confinement
for one year or more are referred to a Board of Review, which may
reconsider findings of law or fact.65 Cases in which the Board of Review
has approved a death sentence go automatically to the United States
Court of Military Appeals; other Board of Review cases may go to the
Court of Military Appeals by order of the service Judge Advocate
General or, when accepted by the court, by petition of the accused.00
The military high court reviews only matters of law.67 While the effi-
cacy of the military Boards of Review has been questioned,08 the three
civilian judges of the United States Court of Military Appeals have
been stern guardians of servicemen's rights. As Professor Bishop has
pointed out, "the delicate perceptions of the present Court of Military
Appeals ... have sniffed out fatal denials of due process in situations
in which their presence would probably not have been noticed by most
civilian judges." 69
Initially, the rights protected with such care by the Court of Military
Appeals were only those provided by the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, since the court decided in an early case that military trials
63. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) was created by the Act of May 5,
1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107 (now 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964)). In recodifying tile military
law Congress extended to the military by statutory provision many of the explicit guaran-
tees of the Bill of Rights. See UCMJ, arts. 31 (self-incrimination), 44 (former jeop-
ardy), 46 (compulsory process), 55 (cruel or unusual punishment), 10 U.S.C. §§ 831, 844,
846, 855 (1964). Aside from the right to jury, see notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text,
the principal differences between the Uniform Code and the Bill of Rights are in tile
areas of counsel, see UCMJ, arts. 27, 38, 70, 10 U.S.C. §§ 827, 838, 870 (196-1); confronta-
tion, see UCMJ, art, 49, 10 U.S.C. § 849 (1964); and bail (no provision).
64. For provisions dealing with post-conviction review of court-marital proceedings,
see generally UCMJ, arts. 59-76, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859-76 (1964).
65. UCMJ, art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1964). Cases affecting general or flag officers are
also referred to a Board of Review.
66. UCMJ, art. 67 (b), 10 U.S.C. § 867(b) (1964). Cases involving general or flag
officers also go automatically to the Court of Military Appeals.
67. UCMJ, art. 67(d), 10 U.S.C. § 867(d) (1964).
68. See Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel Before the Sub.
committee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th
Cong. 2d Sess. 782, 793-94 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
69. Bishop, supra note 49, at 57 n.87. See also Warren, supra note 57, at 189. A
prime example of the "delicate perceptions" of the court is its willingness to assess the
competency of defense counsel. While civilian courts are notoriously reluctant to con-
sider the ineptness of counsel, the Court of Military Appeals has reversed convictions
or set sentences for rehearings because defense counsel lacked knowledge of the appli.
cable law or failed to present favorable evidence. See United States v. Rosenblatt, 13
U.S.C.M.A. 28, 32 C.M.R. 28 (1962); United States v. Rose, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 400, 30 C.M.R.
400 (1961); United States v. Gardner, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 25 C.M.R. 310 (1958); United
States v. Allen, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 504, 25 C.M.R. 8 (1957).
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were beyond the ken of the Bill of Rights.-° The past six years, how-
ever, have seen a radical upheaval in this doctrine. The court has moved
to the position that "the protections in the Bill of Rights, except those
which are expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable, are avail-
able to members of our armed forces."' '
The reasons for this growing awareness that the military law must
to some degree be conditioned by the Constitution can be stated sim-
ply. The military system has multiplied from a small band of volun-
teers at the birth of the Republic72 to an establishment of several mil-
lion men.7 3 The professional soldier who could be said to have chosen
his world and the law that went with it has been replaced, in large
measure, by the draftee or reluctant volunteer. Even assuming that the
Bill of Rights was drawn without regard for the military, the Supreme
Court has recognized too often the futility of "a too literal quest for
the advice of the Founding Fathers"74 where conditions and institu-
tions have changed beyond recognition. 0
Moreover, the scant remaining strength of the historical argument
is further weakened by the expansion of military jurisdiction since
1791. The eighteenth century courts-martial to which the Framers paid
such small attention tried only military offenses.7" Not until 1863 were
courts-martial given jurisdiction over certain "civilian" offenses com-
70. United States v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951).
71. United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (1960);
see also United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963) (concurring
opinions of Quinn, C.J., and Ferguson, J.); United States v. Sutton, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 220,
229, 11 C.M.R. 220, 229 (1953) (dissenting opinion of Quinn, C.J.); for an even stronger
statement which would except only those rights excluded "in so many words," see Hear-
ings 181 (testimony of Quinn, C.J.). The court has not hesitated to revicv the on-
stitutionality of the statutory provisions of the Uniform Code in extending new rights
to servicemen. See United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.I.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
In Jacoby article 49, 10 U.S.C. § 849 (1964), was "interpreted" to require the preence of
the accused and his counsel at the taking of a deposition to be used at trial. The hold-
ing was reached by finding that the contrary interpretation-which was the dear word-
ing of the article, which had been consistently applied in courts-martial, and 1which
earlier had been upheld by the court--"lends itself to conflict with the Sixth Amend-
ment." 11 U.S.C.M.A. at 433, 29 C.M.R. at 249.
72. A few months after Washington's first inauguration the army consisted of 672 of the
840 men authorized by Congress. Report of Secretary of War Knox to the Congre on
the Military Force in 1789, 1 Am. ST. PAP. Mt.. ArF. 6 (1789).
73. The Defense Department reported that the armed forces totaled 3,184,043 men
in August, 1966. N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1966, p. 11, col. 1.
74. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (concurring opinion
of Brennan, J.).
75. See, e.g., id. at 237-42; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483. 489.93 (1954);
Home Bldg. S- Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934).
76. For general discussions of the expansion in the subject-matter jurisdiction of
courts-martial, see Bishop, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Military.Civilian Hybrids:
Retired Regulars, Reservists, and Discharged Prisoners, 112 U. PA. L RE'. 317, 321-27
(1964); Duke & Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Army): Another Problem of
Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 13 VAND. L. Rrv. 435, 449-55 (1960).
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mitted during wartime. 7 And the further extension of military juris-
diction to encompass all civilian offenses committed in peacetime was a
twentieth century phenomenon not completed until 1950.18 The au-
thors of the Bill of Rights may have intended to allow Congress and
the military authorities to enforce military discipline as they would,
but the general criminal jurisdiction of today's court-martial was be-
yond their contemplation.
This note does not attempt to prescribe the ultimate status of ser-
vicemen under the Constitution. The focus rather will be on the pre-
liminary question of how this status should be determined: what agen-
cies are best suited for the task, and what considerations should guide
them. Some tentative indications of the rights which can and should
be accorded servicemen will emerge as a byproduct of the analysis.
If the lower federal courts hew to their narrow interpretation of the
"fully and fairly" evaluated test sketched in Burns v. Wilson, they will
not play a significant role in resolving the constitutional issues."' The
popular interpretation of Burns, however, is neither the only nor the
best analysis.
Justice Frankfurter criticized the Court in his second opinion for
not applying civilian developments to the military sphere.80 This, to-
gether with Vinson's cursory discussion of the reasons why "the scope
of matters open for review has always been more narrow than in civil
cases," 8' convinced the lower courts that whatever the new scope of
review under Burns, it bore no relation to the expanding civilian stan-
dard. The conclusion was unjustified. While the Chief Justice did not
cite a single civilian case in his opinion, there is good reason to believe
that his reasoning was influenced by recent civilian decisions. More-
over, his opinion can be read to encompass a scope of review differing
only marginally, if at all, from the then prevailing civilian doctrine.
The question in Burns was "whether the allegations of the petitions
77. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 30, 12 Stat. 736. See Coleman v. Tennessee, 97
U.S. 509 (1878) (upholding statute).
78. The Artides of War of 1916, ch. 418, § 1342, 39 Stat. 650, and those of 1920, dh,
227, 41 Stat. 787, extended court-martial jurisdiction to most peacetime felonies except
the capital offenses of rape and murder committed within the United States. See Lee v.
Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959). Jurisdiction over the latter offenses was extended to courts-
martial by the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950.
79. See notes 50-53 supra and accompanying text.
80. Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 844 (1953) (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.), denyihg
rehearing of 346 U.S. 137 (1953); see notes 42, 45, 46 supra and accompanying text.
81. Bums v. Wilson, 846 U.S. 187, 139 (1953); see notes 38-39 supra and accompanying
text.
392
Vol. 76: 380, 1966
Servicemen
... require[d] a hearing on the merits."82 The answer hinged on the
-weight to be accorded the prior determinations of the military courts.
The Vinson opinion held that "when a military decision has dealt fully
and fairly -with an allegation . . . , it is not open to a federal civil
court to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate the evidence."84 Here the
Chief Justice virtually echoed the earlier language of the Court in the
civilian case Ex parte Hawk:8 5
Where the state courts have considered and adjudicated the
merits of his contentions... a federal court will not ordinarily re-
examine... the questions thus adjudicated.... But where resort
to state court remedies has failed to afford a full and fair adjudica-
tion of the federal contentions raised..., a federal court should
entertain his petition for habeas corpus.80
The Court did not specify under what out-of-the-ordinary circum-
stances the federal courts should re-examine issues already "fully and
fairly" adjudicated in state courts. Part of the uncertainty was removed
in Brown v. Allen, 7 decided only four months before Burns. In
Brown the Court held that state court determinations of questions of
constitutional law were reviewable in habeas corpus proceedings, while
state court findings of fact would not be disturbed, except in unusual
circumstances.88
Such then was the law at the time Burns was decided, if not when
the case was argued.89 While the "fully and fairly" evaluated test an-
nounced by the Vinson opinion indicates some permeation of civilian
doctrine into military habeas corpus, the petitioners' allegations must
be examined to determine the extent to which the standard of Brown
v. Allen was actually applied.
In holding that a hearing would be required only "had the military
courts manifestly refused to consider those claims,"' 0 Vinson in effect
82. Bums v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 335, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1952), aff'd sub nom. Burns v. Wilson,
346 U.S. 137 (1953).
83. There was patently no question of court-martial jurisdiction over the petitioners
or the crimes, nor of the court-martial's power to impose the death sentence.
84. Bums v. Wilson, 346 US. 137, 142 (1953).
85. 521 U.S. 114 (1944).
86. Id. at 118. (Emphasis added.)
87. 344 U.. 443 (1953).
88. Id. at 458; see also the separate opinion of Frankfurter, J., also for the Court
on this point, id. at 497-513.
89. Burns was argued four days before Brown was handed down. For conflicting
views on whether Brown represented a radical upheaval in habeas corpus doctrine or
merely made explicit what had gone before, compare Bator, supra note 20 at 463-64.
with Reitz, supra note 20 at 1328-30, and Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895, 895 n.4
(1966).
90. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953).
399
The Yale Law Journal
gave conclusive weight to the findings of the military agencies. If the
Chief Justice regarded these claims as turning on questions of fact, it
is possible to conclude that Brown was applied.
Vinson seems to have so regarded them. While such allegations as
the use of a coerced confession would normally be a mixed question
of fact and law for re-examination by the federal habeas corpus court,0 1
the claims in Burns centered on allegations that certain events had
transpired. 92 Until these facts were established by the petitioners, no
question of law could arise, and the military reviewing courts "con-
cluded that petitioners had been accorded a complete opportunity to
establish the authenticity of their allegations, and had failed.' 03 That
the Chief Justice regarded this as a determination of simple evidentiary
fact is indicated by his language: "Accordingly, it is not the duty of
the civil courts to ... re-examine and reweigh each item of evidence
of the occurrence of events which tend to prove or disprove one of the
allegations... ."04 Moreover, both the district court"3 and the court of
appeals, 90 as well as Justices Douglas and Black in dissent, 7 seem also
to have regarded the allegations as presenting questions of fact.08
The vice of the Vinson opinion was thus probably not a blanket
rejection of civilian precedents but a failure to make explicit the ex-
tent to which civilian standards were applied. Although the confusion
wrought in the lower courts is hardly surprising, their use of the "fully
and fairly" evaluated test to bar review of questions of law as well as
of findings of fact scarcely seems justified.
This analysis of Burns is supported by several recent judicial chal-
lenges to the popular interpretation of the Vinson opinion. In Appli-
cation of Stapley,99 the Utah district court concluded that its jurisdic-
91. See, e.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
92. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 143-44 (1953); see Brief for Respondents, pp. .G.
93. 346 U.S. at 144.
94. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
95. "[T]he various military authorities . . . determined [the allegations] . . . to be
factually groundless." Burns v. Lovett, 104 F. Supp. 312, 313 (D.D.C. 1952).
96. "Thus the admissibility of the confessions was determined by the resolution
of a disputed issue of fact." Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 335, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1952). "The
decision of the court [on the claim of perjured testimony] represents a finding upon a
disputed question of fact." Id. at 347.
97. The dissent argued that "the petitioners [were] entitled to a judicial hearing
on the circumstances surrounding their confessions," 346 U.S. at 152, and conceded that
a "rehash of the same facts by a federal court" would be unnecessary if a proper re-
view had been made by the military agencies. Id. at 154.
98. Differences of opinion on the thorny distinction between questions of fact and
law are always possible, of course. The important point in the text discussion is not
whether the allegations presented in truth only questions of fact, but whether the
Chief Justice so regarded them, since this factor alone is critical in determining the
scope of review actually applied in his opinion.
99. 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
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tion extended to the "vindication" of petitioner's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. 00 The Stapley court made no attempt to reconcile its
decision with the conventional interpretation of Burns. A more refined
approach was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Gibbs v. Blaclwell.1'0
While the case was remanded on other grounds, 10 2 the appellate judges
criticized the district court for making "little more than a technical
review of jurisdiction."'1 3 In adopting a broad reading of Burns and
pointing out that the issues there were chiefly factual,104 the court
stated: "In reviewing military convictions, the courts must be on guard
that they do not fail to perceive the difference between reviewing ques-
tions of fact and law."' 05
The Court of Claims also relied on the law-fact dichotomy last
spring in a suit for back pay by a Navy officer sentenced to dismissal
by a court-martial. 06 The contention in Shaw was that the Navy had
followed an unconstitutional interpretation of the relevant statutes in
convicting the officer of embezzlement. In granting a judgment for the
plaintiff, 07 the court distinguished Begalke v. United States, s08 in
which the "fully and fairly" evaluated test had been applied to estop
examination of the plaintiff's claims, as involving chiefly factual is-
sues.109 The court continued, in discussing its prior interpretations of
Burns, "Whether or not this rule of deference to the military findings
100. Id. at 320. A majority of the Court of Military Appeals decided in United
States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963), that the serviceman's right
to counsel arose not only under the Uniform Code but also under the Sixth Amend-
ment. The military court, however, concluded that the untrained officer afforded the
accused in a special court-martial (see UCMJ, art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1964)) satisfied
the requirements of the amendment. The Utah district court in Staple decided that at
least in the context of the specific case the Sixth Amendment required a trained lawyer
as counsel. While the court limited its holding to the unpalatable facts of the case,
Stapley cannot help but call into question the constitutionality of representation by
untrained counsel in special courts-martial.
101. 354 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1965).
102. Gibbs claimed that he had spent over 20 years in prison and on parole in
serving a 15-year sentence for murder, and that he had lost over seven ycars' time on
parole because his parole was revoked when he became drunk on three occasions. The
court concluded that the development of a full record was required to determine whether
the "allegedly harsh application" of the federal parole statutes raised constitutional
questions. Id. at 469-70.
103. Id. at 471.
104. Id. at 472.
105. Id. at 471.
106. Shaw v. United States, 357 F.2d 949 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
107. The court's judgment extended only to a recovery of salary due, however, and
not to a restoration of his officer's commission or a change in the character of his dis-
missal. One experienced commentator dains, though, that a favorable judgment in
the Court of Claims will usually enable the successful plaintiff to secure administrative
correction of his discharge or dismissal. See Everett, Military Administrative Discharges.-
The Pendulum Swings, 1966 Dunn L.J. 41, 68.
108. 286 F.2d 606 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
109. 357 F.2d at 954.
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[of fact] has been modified or refined by Townsend v. Saint" . ..,
we think that such abstinence is not to be practiced where the service-
man presents pure issues of constitutional law, unentangled with ap-
praisal of a special set of facts.""'
The preceding analysis shows that Burns can be read to permit de
novo review of questions of constitutional law in military habeas
corpus proceedings, just as in civilian cases." 2 But, however permissi-
ble, the de novo review accorded military claims must be tempered by
a realization of the unfamiliarity of civilian judges with the distinctive
purposes and problems of the military law. Several considerations
should lead federal courts to a discretionary deference to the findings
of military courts on certain constitutional issues. In the first place, the
military law represents an historical process in which the federal courts
have not played a part. Second, in gauging the "fundamental fairness"
of a court-martial procedure, a familiarity with military institutions not
110. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
111. 357 F.2d at 954. For another recent case suggesting a broad scope of review, see
Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (Ist Cir. 1965). Since Ashe's imprisonment had been
completed, habeas corpus was not available and Ashe instead brought an action for
mandamus to compel the Secretary of Defense to take favorable action on his petition
to change the dishonorable character of his discharge. Having concluded that the
plaintiff had been denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel
at his 1948 court-martial, the court of appeals directed the district court to issue tile
requested writ, reasoning that "a district court at the place of his [former] incarceration
would have been obligated to grant him a writ of habeas corpus .. " Id. at 280.
112. The remaining constitutional and statutory arguments which would deny fed-
eral courts power to review military claims do not bear scrutiny. On the strength of
certain early Supreme Court dicta, see notes 14, 24 supra and accompanying text, It haq
been argued that the constitutional grant of power to Congress "to make rules for the
government and regulation of the land and naval forces," U.S. CONSM. art. I, § 8, ci. 14,
leaves federal courts without power to review the legislative determination of military
rights, see, e.g., Thomas v. Davis, 249 F.2d 232, 235 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 1355
U.S. 927 (1958); Day v. Wilson, 247 F.2d 60, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (dissenting opinion of
Prettyman, J.). It has never been made clear, however, why Clause 14 of Section 8 of
Article I should be exempted from the Bill of Rights any more than the other 17 are,
Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Constitution hardly show
that the Framers intended to remove the military from judicial scrutiny. By far the
stronger construction of Clause 14 finds it an expression by the Framers that the rule-
making authority over the military should be vested in the legislative branch rather
than the executive. See Duke & Vogel, supra note 76, at 447-49.
It has also been argued that federal courts cannot afford habeas corpus relief to mili.
tary prisoners because article 76 of the Uniform Code, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1964), provides
that final court-marital orders "are binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, and
officers of the United States .. " The Supreme Court refused to hold in Gusik v,
Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 132 (1950), that the immediate predecessor to this finality pro.
vision in the 1948 Articles of War, Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, Title I, § 26, 62 Stat.
635, deprived federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions from military
prisoners. A contrary interpretation would have presented interesting constitutional
questions in view of Article I, Section 9. Moreover, the Supreme Court has made such
relief available to civilians convicted by courts-martial. See notes 59-62 supra. Chief
Justice Vinson nevertheless suggested enigmatically in Burns, 346 U.S. at 142, that article
76 somehow affects the scope of review. Justice Frankfurter, however, examined the
legislative history of article 76 and concluded that "the 'finality' provision is completely
irrelevant to any consideration concerning the proper scope of inquiry in military habeas
corpus cases." 346 U.S. at 850.
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possessed by civilian courts is an important asset. Third, the purposes
of the military law include not only crime prevention, but also the
creation and maintenance of the strict discipline necessary in a fighting
organization. And finally, in practice the military justice must some-
times be meted out under battlefield conditions in which civilian stan-
dards cannot be observed.
An idea of the distinctive coloration constitutional problems may
take on in military surroundings is best imparted by illustration. In
the substantive realm the requirements of military discipline may
qualify even the preferred values of free speech and association. Con-
sider the case suggested earlier, that of the young Army lieutenant who
pickets against the war in Vietnam.113 Article 88 of the Uniform Code
provides for the punishment of "any commissioned officer who uses
contemptuous words against the President . ..."114 On the face of the
statute, the officer has committed an offense. And were the facts altered
slightly, to put the young lieutenant in uniform and on a military
base, few would argue that he had not. Military discipline and the tra-
ditional subordination of the military to civilian authority both re-
quire some limitation on the free speech of officers.
The difficult twist arises from the off-duty status of the picketing
officer. On the one hand, the officer in mufti does not cease to be an
officer. On the other hand, the young lieutenant should have the op-
portunity to express his convictions as an individual rather than an
officer. Which considerations should be given controlling weight must
depend on the individual case. Suppose, for example, that the young
officer was picketing not against the war in Vietnam, but against his
base commander's policy of holding Saturday morning inspections.
Here the problem would be one of military discipline. A federal court
faced with such a situation, while empowered to review the issue,
would be wise to accept the military tribunal's decision as to whether
the impact on discipline justified the punishment of the picketing
officer.
In the actual case, however, the officer was registering his dissent not
against local command practices but against national policies. In this
context a federal court, while considering the military tribunal's esti-
113. The example is based, with inconsequential changes, on the case of Lt. Henry
H. Howe, Jr., whose conviction under articles 88 and 133 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 888,
933 (1964) was affirmed by an Army Board of Review. United States v. Howe, CM 413739,
Bd. of Rev., Nov. 3, 1966. The case is now on appeal to the Court of Military Appeals.
114. 10 U.S.C. § 888 (1964). The article can be traced to the 1806 Articles ol War,
where it was approved by President Jefferson despite its obvious resemblance to the
Sedition Act of 1798. See Wiener, supra note 12, at 267-70.
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mation of the impact on discipline, should make its own determination
of the need to limit the officer's right to speak on political issues while
"off duty."
Suppose now that a court-martial has convicted the young officer
and the convening authority orders him confined.11, The lieutenant
petitions a federal court for a Writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he
has been denied his constitutional right to bail pending appeal.110 On
historical grounds, the federal court would have no difficulty conclud-
ing that the right to bail has never been known to the military law.117
Moreover, the nature of military life, with its constant limitations on
the individual's freedom of movement, may arguably make the very
concept of bail inapplicable.1 8 But the early military law never pro-
vided for lengthy and drawn-out appellate review, and confinement
in a disciplinary barracks can hardly be equated with the officer's nor-
mal subjection to the commands of his superiors.
Should the federal court inquire into the constitutionality of the
lieutenant's confinement? Conditions have changed sufficiently to de-
stroy the historical argument, and some stronger justification should
be required to support the denial of bail. The military authorities may
argue that the respect demanded for the officer corps would suffer if
enlisted men were exposed to the offender who a court-martial has
decided is unfit to be an officer.
While the civilian court should not discount the need for discipline
and morale, it can ask the military whether the officer's confinement is
the only feasible safeguard. The officer could, for example, be released
to a non-duty status and temporarily assigned to a station where no
enlisted man need know of his "unfitness." Unless the military com-
mand could show the impossibility of such a compromise solution,
mandatory confinement should be found constitutionally impermis-
sible.
The need for discipline, while not decisive in the context of the
right to bail, may play a more prominent role in other areas. Prime
115. Colonel Wiener has suggested that this practice, widespread under the Uniform
Code, may violate article 13 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 813 (1964). Hearings 798 (testimony
of F. Weiner). No federal court has passed on the merits of this theory, however, anti
the text will consider only the constitutional problem.
116. In the case of Lt. Howe, see note 113 supra, the application for habeas corpus
was denied by the district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Application
was then made to Mr. Justice Black, but Lt. Howe was released and the case rendered
moot before action was taken on the application. Letter From Melvin Wulf, Legal DI-
rector, American Civil Liberties Union, to Yale Law Journal, March 25, 1966, on file in
Yale Law Library.
117. See Wiener, supra note 12, at 284-86 and authorities cited therein.
118. See Henderson, supra note 8, at 316.
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examples are problems of search and seizure. The Fourth Amend-
ment's concern for privacy, if not inapplicable to the military, at least
must be tailored to the distinctive characteristics of military life.
Crowded and often communal living spaces cannot be reconciled with
a full measure of privacy, and military discipline must include the
barracks.
The Court of Military Appeals has established the standard that
commanding officers may authorize evidentiary searches only on the
same showing of probable cause that would justify the issuance of a
warrant by a federal magistrate." 9 Similarly, a search must be reason-
ably incident to a valid arrest to be justified on that basis.120 A problem
arises, however, when evidence is seized in the course of a routine in-
spection. In United States v. Lange " the military court concluded that
the supposedly routine "shakedown inspection" had in fact been an
illegal search for recently stolen property. But the military courts have
yet to delineate the boundary between legitimate inspections and il-
legal searches, and the proper role of civilian courts in reviewing their
determinations is anything but clear. Any living space inspection vio-
lates privacy. On the other hand, to allow the enlisted man-or even
the junior officer-to retreat to a privileged sanctuary in his military
quarters would be a radical upheaval for the services. The difficult
task of balancing the conflicting goals of privacy and discipline is ar-
guably a problem best left to tribunals with special knowledge of the
military system.22
While disciplinary objectives shape the substantive boundaries of
the military law, the procedural rights of servicemen can hardly be
affected by this factor. 2 3 A coerced confession is unrelated to military
119. United States v. Penman, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 67, 36 C.M.R. 223 (1966; United States
v. Dollison, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 595, 36 C.M.R. 93 (1966); United States %. Harsook, 15
U.S.C.M.A. 291, 35 C.M.R. 263 (1965); United States v Browvn, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 482, 28
C.MYa 48 (1959).
120. United States v. Herberg, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 247, 35 C.M.R. 219 (195).
121. 15 U.S.C.M.A. 486, 35 C.M.R. 458 (1965).
122. The three judges of the Court of Military Appeals acquire their "special knowledge
of the military system" only while serving on the bench, since they are by statute appointed
by the President "from civilian life." UCMJ, art. 67(a)(1), 10 US.C. § 867(a)(1) (194). The
judges are appointed for 1-year terms, and during the court's first 15 )-ears only two
vacancies have occurred. Since the present judges have served 15, 10 and 5 )-ears respectively,
it can fairly be said of the military high court that, as Justice Frankfurter stated in another
context, "the exercise of its functions [has given] it accumulating insight not vouchsafed
to courts dealing episodically with the practical problems" of military law.
123. This statement might be qualified by the proposition that the importance of
discipline compels the military law to place greater emphasis on the punishment and
less on the protection of the innocent than does civilian justice. Thus, the structure of
civilian society is not threatened by a moderate amount of crime, and the criminal law is
therefore able to place considerable emphasis on the protection of the innocent, even at
some cost in deterrence. The effectiveness of the military organization, on the other hand,
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discipline, as are the guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
Wartime conditions, however, may sometimes preclude a full measure
of procedural due process.124 Witnesses may be dead, far away or other-
wise unavailable by the time of trial, particularly because a prompt
trial may be impractical. If battlefield offenses are to be controlled,
some procedural rights must be shaded. The requirement of a fair
trial can be reconciled with the necessity of controlling crime only on
the facts of each case. And the decisions of military courts, with their
fuller understanding of the problems of an army in the field, deserve
marked respect by civilian courts.
The institutional framework of the military law may also present
problems for a civilian court. The court-martial, for example, is an
instrument of the military law enshrined by time. The Court of Mili-
tary Appeals is better versed than any civilian court in the intricacies
of court-martial procedures, and therefore is often better qualified to
place a claimed denial of procedural due process of law in the broad
context of court-martial operation. But the importance of the civilian
court's unfamiliarity with military procedure can be overrated. Differ-
ences of at least comparable magnitude are often present in the state
law which the Supreme Court now regularly subjects to constitutional
review. Moreover, military institutions may often be analogized to
civilian practices to determine whether the accused was tried fairly.
The court-martial, for example, functions basically as a jury in decid-
ing questions of fact, although the court or its president also makes
certain legal rulings.125 Where constitutional standards have been es-
tablished for the selection of juries, the same or similar principles may
govern the selection of court-martial members. To pose a concrete
problem, while the Court of Military Appeals would unquestionably
not tolerate the deliberate exclusion of Negroes from a court-martial,
it has approved the deliberate inclusion of a Negro on a court-
is arguably threatened when discipline is less than absolute, and therefore the military
law cannot afford to protect the innocent if discipline will thereby suffer. See United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955); Wiener, supra note 12, at 29394.,
Implicit in this reasoning is the assumption that discipline will suffer if the Innocent are
protected. While this may be true, the converse can also be argued: since the intangibles
of attitude and morale are so important in any system of discipline not based exclusively
on fear, discipline may suffer from the resulting dislike and distrust of the enforcement
agencies if the innocent are not protected.
124. See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) (rape committed while Army was racing
across Germany in 1945); Day v. Davis, 235 F.2d 379 (10th Cir. 1956) (murder committed
in 1950 while Seoul, Korea, was being evacuated in face of Chinese offensive).
125. Almost all interlocutory questions arising in a general court-martial are ruled upon
by a law officer who is not a member of the court; interlocutory rulings in a special court.
martial are normally made by the president (highest ranking member) of the court, See
UCMJ, arts. 26, 41, 51, 10 U.S.C. §§ 826, 841, 851 (1964).
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martial.1 28 In doing so the court rejected the reasoning of an earlier
Fifth Circuit case which held unconstitutional the purposeful inclu-
sion of Negroes on a grand jury list- 7 but did not explain why any
of the distinguishing characteristics of the military law justified a less
color-blind standard in the selection of court-martial members. Were
the question to come before a federal habeas corpus court, therefore,
the military decision would deserve little if any weight.
A more difficult problem is presented by the way in which enlisted
men are selected for service on courts-martial. While courts-martial are
traditionally composed of officers, an enlisted defendant may demand
a limited number of fellow enlisted men on his court.18 The custom
of appointing enlisted men from the highest ratings has been attacked
on the theory that such career men, with certain command responsi-
bilities, will be more likely to find a punishable breach of discipline
in, say, a barracks brawl than would a lower-rated enlisted man. The
Court of Military Appeals has rejected the argument on the ground
that such appointment practices are reasonably designed to meet the
statutory requirement that those "best qualified by reason of age,
education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temper-
ament ' 129 be appointed. 30 Nor would the military court conclude that
senior enlisted men would be prejudicially inclined to find insubordi-
nation or a breach of discipline where the average enlisted man would
not.' 3' The problem can be analogized to that of the "blue ribbon"
jury, and by the test adopted in those cases, the enlisted man would
have to show the likelihood of bias. 32 The military court is unargu-
ably more qualified to make the necessary evaluation of military atti-
tudes; should the issue come before a civilian habeas corpus court, the
military decision should ordinarily be accepted.
Cases of command influence present another area requiring special-
ized judgment of military psychology. Article 37 of the Uniform
126. United States v. Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 41, 35 C.M.RL 3, 13 (1964).
127. Collins v. Walker, 329 F.2d 100 (5th Cir.), on rehearing, 335 F.2d 417, cerl. denied,
379 U.S. 901 (1964). The military court's decision also ignores Justice Reed's dictum in
Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 287 (1950), that "an accused is entitled to have charges
against him considered by a jury in the selection of which there has been neither inclusion
nor exclusion because of race." While the Fifth Circuit overruled Collins last summer in
Brooks v. Beto, No. 22809, 5th Cir., July 29, 1966, the fragmentation of the Court of
Appeals in both cases indicates that the problem of purposeful inclusion cannot yet be
considered conclusively resolved.
128. UCMJ, art. 25(c), 10 U.S.C. § 825(c) (1964).
129. UCMJ, art. 25(d)(2), 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (1964).
130. United States v. Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 39-40, 35 C.M.R. 3, 11-12 (1964).
131. Id. at 40, 35 C.M.P. at 12.
132. See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); Moore v. New York, 333 US. 565 (1948).
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Code 133 forbids command interference with the actions of courts-
martial, but in such broad outline that the problem can as readily be
analyzed by a constitutional test of fundamental fairness. The military
court has already driven from the field such heavy-handed practices as
the appointment of a new court president in mid-trial after a ruling
adverse to the prosecution. 134 But senior military officers are not easily
persuaded that subordinates should be denied guidance merely be-
cause of appointment to court-martial boards, and command policy
can be expressed in devious ways.135 The most popular stratagem is
pre-trial orientation pamphlets or lectures, in which bland homilies
concerning the duties of a court-martial member are spiced with
pointed suggestions on sentencing policies or the need for convic-
tions.136
To decide whether such suggestions denied the defendant an im-
partial trial, the court must gauge their effect on the court-martial
members. The peculiar perspective of the military man toward au-
thority makes this task difficult. The serviceman is unused to receiving
suggestions from superior officers. However gently phrased, a recom-
mendation can safely be construed only as an order; the gracious into-
nation thinly masks the gravelly voice of the parade ground. Moreover,
the court-martial member can scarcely forget that the commanding
officer who approves the fitness report so vital to his promotion may
well consider his court performance.
The military mind may be something of a mystery to even the Court
of Military Appeals, but at least its members have had greater exposure
to it than most civilian judges. Controlling the zeal of the lecturers and
pamphleteers is a task best left, within limits, to the military court.
The problems examined show that the constitutional questions
which may arise in the military law do not dissolve into simple an-
swers. In balancing individual rights against military needs, the civilian
courts cannot claim a monopoly on wisdom. The federal habeas corpus
court must recognize those areas in which the specialized and quite
capable voice of the Court of Military Appeals should be heeded.
133. 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1964).
134. See United States v. Whitley, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 786, 19 C.M.R. 82 (1955); sec also
United States v. Knudson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 587, 16 C.M.R. 161 (1954) (after granting con-
tinuance to defense, law officer received directive from convening authority to resume trial).
135. See United States v. Kitchens, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 589, 31 C.M.R. 175 (1961) (sentence
set aside because assistant staff judge advocate solicited suggestions for "personal informa
tion" why proportion of punitive discharge sentences had purportedly declined).
136. See United States v. Albert, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 111, 36 C.M.R. 267 (1966); United States
v. Johnson, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 548, 34 C.M.R. 328 (1964); United States v. Littrice, 3 U.S.C.M.A.
487, 13 C.M.R. 43 (1953).
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Whether in so doing the federal courts limit themselves to a more
narrow scope of collateral review than in civilian cases or whether
different factors are considered in applying a scope of equal breadth
may be a matter of phrasing, "but since phrasing mirrors thought, it
is important that the phrasing not obscure the true issue before a
federal court."i137 The critical conclusion is that the finality to be al-
lowed a military court determination of constitutional rights should
be based on a careful analysis of the competence of civilian judges and
not on mere procedural confusion.
A prime example of the latter is the peculiar doctrine mentioned
earlier that military courts cannot be considered to have "manifestly
refused" to consider "fully and fairly" a claim not raised before them,
and hence that the federal court cannot pass upon the issue in a habeas
corpus proceeding.13 Professor Reitz has shown the chaos wrought in
the civilian courts by the frequently confused doctrines of waiver, ex-
haustion of remedies and adequate state grounds.239 Fay v. Noia'40
eliminated much of the confusion in the civilian case law. Since the
desirability of a federal court adjudication of a constitutional claim
when no other remedy is still available seems unaffected by any dis-
tinctive characteristic of military law, the reasoning of Fay should gov-
ern military cases. The Fifth Circuit edged tremulously toward this
position in Williams v. Heritage,'4' and it can be hoped that other
courts will reach the same conclusion with greater clarity and confi-
dence.
If habeas corpus relief is to be made available to the military pris-
oner unless he has "deliberately bypassed" the opportunity to raise his
claim in the military courts, the civilian courts may find themselves
called upon to review constitutional issues which have never been pre-
sented to the Court of Military Appeals. Such cases would confront a
federal court with a claim deserving adjudication, but one which it
might want the military court to decide or at least examine. A proce-
dure by which the petitioner could obtain military review either prior
to or in lieu of a federal habeas corpus proceeding would be desirable
in these cases.
The problem could be solved forthwith by a statute allowing the
federal court to refer petitions in such cases to the military court or
137. Brown v. Allen, 344 US. 443, 501 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
158. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
159. Reitz, supra note 20, at 1332-73; see also Hart, supra note 20, at 101-19.
140. 372 US. 591 (1963).
141. 523 F.2d 731, 731-52 (5th Cir. 1963).
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clearly granting the serviceman the opportunity to collaterally attack
his conviction within the military court system. But the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals seems to have begun a solution within the existing juris-
dictional statutes. The court concluded last spring that its jurisdiction
under the All Writs Statute142 extended to granting writs in the nature
of coram nobis.143 Apparently, the court contemplates using such writs
to allow collateral review of constitutional claims. 144
Collateral review procedures within the military system would
facilitate cooperation between military and civilian courts. Using a
discretionary rule of exhaustion of remedies,1 45 federal courts could
deny without prejudice petitions for habeas corpus which presented
novel constitutional claims. After a decision by the Court of Military
Appeals, the federal court could entertain a new writ if it wished.
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1964).
143. United States v. Frischholz, 16 U.S.C.MA. 150, 86 C.M.R. 806 (1966). The court
concluded that although it had the jurisdiction to issue such a writ, the requirements of
the writ were not met by Frischholz because (1) each claim could have been raised on
appeal and (2) most in fact had been. Id. at 153. While the second reason is unexception-
able, the court may have strayed into an outmoded standard of "procedural default" to the
extent it failed to consider whether Frischholz had been guilty of inexcusable neglect In
failing to raise any claims on appeal. Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-39. The precise
standard applied by the military court in Frischholz is not clear, however.
144. This conclusion is indicated by the fact that the military court was motivated to
examine the extent of its jurisdiction to entertain petitions for collateral relief, a question
it had avoided in two earlier cases, see United States v. Tavares, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 282, 27
C.M.R. 356 (1959); United States v. Buck, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 290, 26 C.M.R. 70 (1958), by the
consideration that "part of our responsibility includes the protection and preservation
of the Constitutional rights of persons in the armed forces," 16 U.S.C.MA. at 152.
145. The exhaustion rule is, of course, discretionary by nature; as the Supreme Court
has held, the rule "is not one defining power but one which relates to the appropriate
exercise of power." Fay v. Nola, 372 U.S. 391, 420 (1963).
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